In my recent post about how poorly our own Civil War had been going for the North even as late as the spring of 1864, I mentioned the incredibly high casualties in that war compared to what we've suffered so far in Iraq.
A commenter named Global Citizen wrote:
Good grief, what about the Iraqi dead?
A timely observation; Global's comment was written on Monday, and it was on Tuesday (yesterday) that two pieces of news came through the wires almost simultaneously: an especially blood-curdling bombing that killed at least sixty people at a university in Baghdad (yes, a graphic demonstration of how the terrorists eat their own young); and the announcement by the UN that, by their calculations, more than 34,000 Iraqi civilians died in violence last year.
The UN figures are disputed by the Iraqi government:
Death tolls in Iraq are controversial because they vary so widely and because there is no uniform, transparent system of tabulating killings throughout the country. The 2006 civilian death toll of 34,452 provided by the UN -- drawn from the Health Ministry, hospital reports and the Medico-Legal Institute of Baghdad -- exceeded official government figures.
Iraq's ministries of defense, health, and interior said in early January that there were 13,896 violent deaths of civilians, police officers, and soldiers last year. An Interior Ministry spokesman, Abdul Kareem al-Kinani, said yesterday's UN figures were "incorrect, unsuccessful, and very exaggerated."
The truth is we don't know the truth, and probably will never know. Both the Iraqi government and the UN are suspect as reporters, and those giving them the data on which any such figures would be based probably have agendas, as well. The expression "the fog of war" covers civilian casualties in a chaotic and violent country in which many sides have a powerful motivation to distort the truth.
But one thing I do know: the murderers are relying on our reporting of the carnage to help their cause by inflaming US public opinion against our mission there.
So, what's the MSM to do? Ignore such a big story? Of course not.
And the killers know that. They also know if they kill enough innocent people with a big enough bang, it will become ever more likely that America will get fed up with our intervention there and leave them alone to do the rest of their dirty work in peace (ironic word, that).
And therein lies the rub for people such as Global--if, that is, they bother to think about what would happen after we leave. I'm afraid that, to many who espouse such an argument, the only Iraqi deaths that really matter are the ones that take place on our watch.
The truth is that Iraq has been a bloody killing field for decades. Back in the years when Saddam and his boys were murdering and torturing Iraqis for fun and profit, did we see the daily death toll printed on the front pages of our newspapers? No, of course not; those deaths slid into the general background noise, the hum of all the other third-world deaths perpetrated by murderous dictators against their own people. Non-Western killers against non-Western victims? For the most part, to the MSM--not our problem, not our news. Relegated to the back pages.
And now, every tally of Iraqi deaths that's published would do well to include a comparison to the deaths under Saddam (which would most likely have continued, unabated, had we not invaded)--or the deaths that are predicted to occur if we leave prematurely. But, of course, they don't. And the left doesn't talk much about these things, either.
It's a bit like the aftermath of the Vietnam War. The suffering perpetrated on the South by the North during that lengthy conflict; the re-education camps and with torture and murder afterwards; and the boat people, so many of whom died in their efforts to escape the regime after we abandoned them--there was hardly so much as a whisper of sorrow from the Left on that score.
Global uses the phrase "good grief" to begin his comment. He/she means it merely as an exclamation of astonishment. But it seemed an apt one to me. Because, to much of the Left, the only good grief to feel is about casualties caused by the US.
The deaths caused by regimes the US is trying to topple? The grief over them isn't nearly as good. And the deaths caused by our abandonment, at the urging of the Left, of a country we had pledged to defend? That's really un-good grief.
In the present conflict in Iraq, the US military has cared more about the number of dead civilians, and tried harder to avoid causing any such deaths, than any fighting force ever has before. And the "surge" policy is meant to flush out and kill the killers of such people.
That, of course, is not enough for the Left. Their remedy for the murders going on now is to leave. And, were we to listen to them, and the aftermath was a huge increase in the number of dead, would the Left ever take any responsibility for that particular bloodbath?
[NOTE: I'm well aware that the far Left often ascribes all casualties, before or after US intervention, as being caused by the US and/or the West in general. According to the Left, damaged third-world countries with murderous dictators are really the result of Western colonialism. Saddam's crimes are on our hands since we supported him now and then because of realpolitik (against the greater threat of Iran, for example). And of course any killings after we leave are our fault as well, because we shouldn't have gone there in the first place.
There is always at least a kernel of truth in these accusations, although they are simplistic and ridiculously reductionist. The US, like all nations, is an imperfect player in an imperfect world. Most of the time we face, as I've written before, "choices among crazinesses."
The validity of the causes for our intervention in Iraq has been rehashed ad nauseum: in a nutshell, I still consider them valid, although our execution has been faulty. The topic of this post, however, is how the MSM shortsightedly picks and chooses which casualties in Iraq to pay attention to, and how the Left uses that information to suggest actions likely to cause more of those innocent Iraqi casualties it purports to care so much about.]
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Iraq: lost in translation?
I've written before about Peter Braestrup's book Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. It describes how the media got the Tet Offensive wrong.
Braestrup's conclusion is that the press errors were mostly multidetermied, and that most of them were not necessarily the result of press bias, but rather misperceptions, misinformation, and ignorance. But the whole thing added up to an error of major proportions, one that had a huge effect on American public opinion.
Granted, Amir Taheri's latest NY Post column is no Big Story. For starters, it's a short essay, not a book. Perhaps we'll call it "Small Story." But that's only because of its length, not its importance. Because there's nothing little about press distortions concerning Iraq, nor about their importance in influencing the course of this war and our will to fight it.
Like Braestrup, Taheri doesn't ascribe all the errors of Iraq reportage to bias or intent. Some are simply the function of reporters' lack of knowledge of the language. Dependent on translators, they don't always get the correct information--especially in the early years, translators often had agendas. Journalist isolation is part of the problem, as well. Both hazards are inherent when trying to cover events in a unfamiliar country that has been blocked from significant contact with the West for decades. Then there's the fact that news of bombings and death is easy to report, and has the old "if it bleeds, it ledes" sensationalistic appeal.
Bias does come into play as well, however. According to Taheri, many papers predicted chaos and failure in Iraq and don't want to be proven wrong, and thus they naturally skew their coverage to the negative. Whether or not this motivation is conscious and deliberate, or subtle and hidden, perhaps even from the journalists themselves (I happen to believe the latter is the case), is unknown.
Taheri also gives us some of the Iraqi good news that we usually don't hear too much about:
Last month, Iraq received the U.N.'s special environmental prize for reviving parts of the marshes drained by Saddam, thus saving one of the world's most precious ecological treasures. Almost no one in the media noticed.
Also last month, the Iraqi soccer squad reached the finals of the Asian Games - beating out Japan, China, South Korea and Iran. Again, few in the West noticed.
In 2006, almost 200 major reconstruction projects were officially completed and 4,000 new private companies registered in Iraq. But few seem interested in the return of private capitalism after nearly 50 years of Soviet-style control.
Iraq's new political life is either ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. The creation of political parties (some emerging from decades of clandestine life), the work of Iraq's parliament, the fact that it is almost the only Arab country where people are free to discuss politics to their hearts' content - these are of no interest to those determined to see Iraq as a disaster, as proof that toppling Saddam was a modern version of the original sin.
Iraq may still become any of those things - but right now it is none of them. When the real history of the Iraq war is written, posterity might marvel at the way modern media were used to manufacture that original sin.
Let's hope Taheri never has to write that sorrowful sequel to Braestrup's book: The Bigger Story.
Braestrup's conclusion is that the press errors were mostly multidetermied, and that most of them were not necessarily the result of press bias, but rather misperceptions, misinformation, and ignorance. But the whole thing added up to an error of major proportions, one that had a huge effect on American public opinion.
Granted, Amir Taheri's latest NY Post column is no Big Story. For starters, it's a short essay, not a book. Perhaps we'll call it "Small Story." But that's only because of its length, not its importance. Because there's nothing little about press distortions concerning Iraq, nor about their importance in influencing the course of this war and our will to fight it.
Like Braestrup, Taheri doesn't ascribe all the errors of Iraq reportage to bias or intent. Some are simply the function of reporters' lack of knowledge of the language. Dependent on translators, they don't always get the correct information--especially in the early years, translators often had agendas. Journalist isolation is part of the problem, as well. Both hazards are inherent when trying to cover events in a unfamiliar country that has been blocked from significant contact with the West for decades. Then there's the fact that news of bombings and death is easy to report, and has the old "if it bleeds, it ledes" sensationalistic appeal.
Bias does come into play as well, however. According to Taheri, many papers predicted chaos and failure in Iraq and don't want to be proven wrong, and thus they naturally skew their coverage to the negative. Whether or not this motivation is conscious and deliberate, or subtle and hidden, perhaps even from the journalists themselves (I happen to believe the latter is the case), is unknown.
Taheri also gives us some of the Iraqi good news that we usually don't hear too much about:
Last month, Iraq received the U.N.'s special environmental prize for reviving parts of the marshes drained by Saddam, thus saving one of the world's most precious ecological treasures. Almost no one in the media noticed.
Also last month, the Iraqi soccer squad reached the finals of the Asian Games - beating out Japan, China, South Korea and Iran. Again, few in the West noticed.
In 2006, almost 200 major reconstruction projects were officially completed and 4,000 new private companies registered in Iraq. But few seem interested in the return of private capitalism after nearly 50 years of Soviet-style control.
Iraq's new political life is either ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. The creation of political parties (some emerging from decades of clandestine life), the work of Iraq's parliament, the fact that it is almost the only Arab country where people are free to discuss politics to their hearts' content - these are of no interest to those determined to see Iraq as a disaster, as proof that toppling Saddam was a modern version of the original sin.
Iraq may still become any of those things - but right now it is none of them. When the real history of the Iraq war is written, posterity might marvel at the way modern media were used to manufacture that original sin.
Let's hope Taheri never has to write that sorrowful sequel to Braestrup's book: The Bigger Story.
Monday, January 15, 2007
Cat-and-mouse, jihadis and the "surge:" they can run, but can they hide?
I wondered about it a few days ago: what's to stop the terrorists/jihadis/insurgents in Iraq from running away in the face of the proposed surge, and living to fight another day?
The answer seems to be "nothing, at least for the moment." It's been reported that that's exactly what's happening--the jihadis are dispersing to areas other than Baghdad.
The terrorists are many things, but they're certainly not dumb (although I often think that false perception allowed us to soothe ourselves into our state of torpor during the 80s and 90s). And, despite the frequent characterization by the Left of our own military as poverty-stricken dupes, ignorant victims and tools of the Rovian Right, those leading our armed forces are not stupid, either. It's almost a certainty that this jihadi movement had to have been anticipated by the US.
One of the hallmarks of any successful military campaign is the ability to adjust to changing circumstances. It's good to anticipate events as much as humanly possible; but, realistically speaking, this can't be done perfectly, and the idea is to adapt to changes faster than the enemy.
The comments section of the previous thread on this subject contains many shrewd observations. I excerpt a few here:
(1) The primary strategic weakness is the close margin of support for continued fighting in Iraq. This weakness is telegraphed daily by the NYT and major media.
Tactically, the insurgents would know almost immediately when the surge started.
The strategic strength of this message [Bush's speech] is the commitment of forces itself, even if for a limited period of time, and changes in the rules of engagement.
There will be tactical surprises in the actual mission, and on balance, the telegraphing of the surge and change of ROE more than offsets any benefit of surprise.
(2) Strategies that depend on surprise are not strategies, they are tactics and operational details.
This is almost a matter of definition, because strategies are not executed over the course of hours or days, they are executed over the course of months, years, or in some cases, even decades. As such, if your strategy requires your opposition to be surprised month after month by your strategic approach, your strategy is doomed to failure. In that case, you are implicitly assuming that your opponents are stupid, in which case, why do you need a strategy in the first place?
(3) What can terrorists do differently now that they know? They can't go hiding. Why? Because as the newest Counter Insurgency Manual just told us, insurgencies acquire power by creating chaos and then doing the extortion-protection racket game. But when they succede in doing that as the first part of the insurgency, this means THEY are in Power. This means they are now responsible for security. They can't run anymore. They can run when they have no strongholds. But Sadr? Those Baghdad Sunnis? Their enclaves have been safe from American attack for a long long time now, given the limitations placed on American soldiers.
This post at Iraq the Model, discussing the cut-and-run tactics of the jihadis who are leaving Baghdad for parts somewhat unknown, sheds further light on the matter. Right now, the jihadis' situation somewhat resembles that of an animal who's built a cozy nest for the winter but has been flushed out by a hunter. It takes some time for it to build a new and safe place to dwell, and in the meantime there's increased vulnerability.
It seems that not everyone in Iraq wants the honor of housing these new visitors as they build new homes-away-from-home, despite the highly vaunted Arab virtue of hospitality. According to Iraq the Model, locals are already alerting authorities on the movements of the jihadis.
Unfortunately, there are areas in Iraq, particularly Diwaniya, where the Sadrists have already established cozy nests:
...Diwaniya is not far away from Baghdad, and the past few months had shown the level of the Sdarists strength in that city when order was restored only after reinforcements were summoned from neighboring provinces.
The Sadrists feel they are very strong in Diwaniya and what their man in the city said yesterday shows the level of extremism of the Sadr followers in this city...
...the bad guys are adjusting their plans as the government and US military adjust theirs. The clear and hold tactic means militants will have little chance to maneuver within Baghdad like they used to do to work around previous crackdowns so now they are planning to make long-range maneuvers in provinces outside Baghdad.
The cat-and-mouse game continues. As the cats, we have to be craftier than the mice. And much of that craft depends on anticipation, flexibility, and above all, the quality of the intelligence we receive.
The answer seems to be "nothing, at least for the moment." It's been reported that that's exactly what's happening--the jihadis are dispersing to areas other than Baghdad.
The terrorists are many things, but they're certainly not dumb (although I often think that false perception allowed us to soothe ourselves into our state of torpor during the 80s and 90s). And, despite the frequent characterization by the Left of our own military as poverty-stricken dupes, ignorant victims and tools of the Rovian Right, those leading our armed forces are not stupid, either. It's almost a certainty that this jihadi movement had to have been anticipated by the US.
One of the hallmarks of any successful military campaign is the ability to adjust to changing circumstances. It's good to anticipate events as much as humanly possible; but, realistically speaking, this can't be done perfectly, and the idea is to adapt to changes faster than the enemy.
The comments section of the previous thread on this subject contains many shrewd observations. I excerpt a few here:
(1) The primary strategic weakness is the close margin of support for continued fighting in Iraq. This weakness is telegraphed daily by the NYT and major media.
Tactically, the insurgents would know almost immediately when the surge started.
The strategic strength of this message [Bush's speech] is the commitment of forces itself, even if for a limited period of time, and changes in the rules of engagement.
There will be tactical surprises in the actual mission, and on balance, the telegraphing of the surge and change of ROE more than offsets any benefit of surprise.
(2) Strategies that depend on surprise are not strategies, they are tactics and operational details.
This is almost a matter of definition, because strategies are not executed over the course of hours or days, they are executed over the course of months, years, or in some cases, even decades. As such, if your strategy requires your opposition to be surprised month after month by your strategic approach, your strategy is doomed to failure. In that case, you are implicitly assuming that your opponents are stupid, in which case, why do you need a strategy in the first place?
(3) What can terrorists do differently now that they know? They can't go hiding. Why? Because as the newest Counter Insurgency Manual just told us, insurgencies acquire power by creating chaos and then doing the extortion-protection racket game. But when they succede in doing that as the first part of the insurgency, this means THEY are in Power. This means they are now responsible for security. They can't run anymore. They can run when they have no strongholds. But Sadr? Those Baghdad Sunnis? Their enclaves have been safe from American attack for a long long time now, given the limitations placed on American soldiers.
This post at Iraq the Model, discussing the cut-and-run tactics of the jihadis who are leaving Baghdad for parts somewhat unknown, sheds further light on the matter. Right now, the jihadis' situation somewhat resembles that of an animal who's built a cozy nest for the winter but has been flushed out by a hunter. It takes some time for it to build a new and safe place to dwell, and in the meantime there's increased vulnerability.
It seems that not everyone in Iraq wants the honor of housing these new visitors as they build new homes-away-from-home, despite the highly vaunted Arab virtue of hospitality. According to Iraq the Model, locals are already alerting authorities on the movements of the jihadis.
Unfortunately, there are areas in Iraq, particularly Diwaniya, where the Sadrists have already established cozy nests:
...Diwaniya is not far away from Baghdad, and the past few months had shown the level of the Sdarists strength in that city when order was restored only after reinforcements were summoned from neighboring provinces.
The Sadrists feel they are very strong in Diwaniya and what their man in the city said yesterday shows the level of extremism of the Sadr followers in this city...
...the bad guys are adjusting their plans as the government and US military adjust theirs. The clear and hold tactic means militants will have little chance to maneuver within Baghdad like they used to do to work around previous crackdowns so now they are planning to make long-range maneuvers in provinces outside Baghdad.
The cat-and-mouse game continues. As the cats, we have to be craftier than the mice. And much of that craft depends on anticipation, flexibility, and above all, the quality of the intelligence we receive.
Sunday, January 14, 2007
Iraq War changes: maybe it's a Civil War in more ways than one (see 1864)
Recommended reading on a Sunday: this article by Barry Casselman, comparing Bush and his new proposals for the Iraq war to the situation Lincoln faced in the spring before the 1864 election.
Bush, Lincoln--huh? you say.
Well, read it. Casselman is clear that Bush lacks Lincoln's eloquence, and even much more basic communication skills; those are certainly not the similarities he's suggesting between the two. But he points out that, even as late as 1864, many in the North considered the Civil War a lost cause, and the antiwar movement was strong and included violent draft riots.
The opposition candidate in the election, McClellan, was a "peace now" advocate. And the peaceniks of the time had a lot more to complain about than today's in terms of bloodshed; the casualties in the Civil War (all of them, of course, were US casualties, like it or not--and the Southerners didn't like it) were far greater than today, both in actual terms and compared to the smaller population of the time. Follow the link if you're not familiar with the figures; they are shocking.
Lincoln changed course with a new Supreme Commander in the West, General Sherman, who was promoted to that post in the spring of 1864 and began the relentless campaign that resulted in Union victory. Sherman was:
...ordered by Grant to "create havoc and destruction of all resources that would be beneficial to the enemy."
A year later the South had surrendered, roundly beaten in one of the first total wars.
We look at history from the viewpoint of--well, of history. We have the advantage of the passage of many years and the knowledge of where events were leading. But if a history of the Civil War and evaluations of Lincoln had been written in early 1864, they would look awfully different.
A good recent example of the perspective that comes with time are the lovefests that attended the deaths of Presidents Reagan and Ford, with appreciations galore of administrations that had been excoriated by many in their own time (and are excoriated by many still, to be sure, especially Reagan's).
Whether or not Bush's new Iraq campaign will be successful remains to be seen, of course. Whether or not General Petraeus will be the turn-around general that Sherman was also remains to be seen (he certainly is no advocate of total war, however).
Whether Congress will allow us to find out remains to be seen, as well.
Bush, Lincoln--huh? you say.
Well, read it. Casselman is clear that Bush lacks Lincoln's eloquence, and even much more basic communication skills; those are certainly not the similarities he's suggesting between the two. But he points out that, even as late as 1864, many in the North considered the Civil War a lost cause, and the antiwar movement was strong and included violent draft riots.
The opposition candidate in the election, McClellan, was a "peace now" advocate. And the peaceniks of the time had a lot more to complain about than today's in terms of bloodshed; the casualties in the Civil War (all of them, of course, were US casualties, like it or not--and the Southerners didn't like it) were far greater than today, both in actual terms and compared to the smaller population of the time. Follow the link if you're not familiar with the figures; they are shocking.
Lincoln changed course with a new Supreme Commander in the West, General Sherman, who was promoted to that post in the spring of 1864 and began the relentless campaign that resulted in Union victory. Sherman was:
...ordered by Grant to "create havoc and destruction of all resources that would be beneficial to the enemy."
A year later the South had surrendered, roundly beaten in one of the first total wars.
We look at history from the viewpoint of--well, of history. We have the advantage of the passage of many years and the knowledge of where events were leading. But if a history of the Civil War and evaluations of Lincoln had been written in early 1864, they would look awfully different.
A good recent example of the perspective that comes with time are the lovefests that attended the deaths of Presidents Reagan and Ford, with appreciations galore of administrations that had been excoriated by many in their own time (and are excoriated by many still, to be sure, especially Reagan's).
Whether or not Bush's new Iraq campaign will be successful remains to be seen, of course. Whether or not General Petraeus will be the turn-around general that Sherman was also remains to be seen (he certainly is no advocate of total war, however).
Whether Congress will allow us to find out remains to be seen, as well.
Saturday, January 13, 2007
The return of the missing: two kidnapped boys found
This is the sort of story that can easily make any parent's--or nearly any human being's--eyes mist up. I know it did mine.
One of the worst things on earth to imagine--and, fortunately, for most parents, it's an event that remains in the realm of imagination--is the disappearance of a child. For the Akers, 15-year old Shawn Hornbeck's family, it's been a gut-wrenching, heart-breaking, four-year struggle in which they've dedicated their lives to finding their kidnapped son, and to other missing children. And now their faith, hope, prayers, and work have been rewarded.
For 13-year old Ben Ownby's family, it was "only" a week of suffering. A week that probably lasted twenty lifetimes, all of them bad.
Amidst the joy, one caveat: the reentry, especially for Hornbeck, will probably not be smooth. I am reminded of another story, that of Steven Stayner, who was kidnapped in the early '70s at the age of seven (much younger than these boys) by a pedophile, and kept for over seven years.
Stayner's captor used sophisticated methods of "re-education" on him, convincing the boy that his parents had forgotten about him and didn't want him back, sexually abusing him, and encouraging him to regard him as his new father. Stayner was only found when his kidnapper hauled in new prey, a young child for whom Stayner developed a feeling of compassionate protectiveness. He planned to guide the boy to a police station, but the child was fearful and wanted Stayner to go in with him. In doing so, Stayner himself was detained, and the entire story ended up spilling out.
But Stayner's re-entry into his joyful family was fraught with psychological problems for all concerned, some of them detailed in an unusually fine made-for-TV film entitled, "I Know My First Name Is Steven" (the words Stayner voiced to the police when he was first being interrogated.) There was a book, as well.
The problems were not surprising considering the dreadful trauma and dislocation all had endured--the fact that they had lost a young child and yet a teenager was returned to them, one who'd seen and endured things no child should ever have to face.
Stayner married young and had two children, but tragically, was killed in a motorcycle accident when he was only twenty-four. But the tragedy doesn't end there.
Decades later, his brother Cary Stayner was found guilty of the 1999 murders of four women in Yosemite National Park, where Cary worked at the time. The vicious murders had gripped the nation, and I was glad to hear the news that the killer had been found. But when I heard the perpetrator's identity, I couldn't help but think of Stayner's parents as well, who had emerged from one long nightmare only to enter another, and then another.
It is highly unlikely that the present case will lead to anything remotely like that. I make no excuses for serial murderers, but one still wonders just how much the kidnapping of his brother and the family trauma affected the elder Stayner boy. It certainly is not the case that something like that causes a person to become serial murderer; that much is certain. But it is also true that those who kidnap children harm far more people than those children themselves. They set up a ripple effect with a long reach.
But today is a day of rejoicing. And I add my hopes that these two kidnapped boys have a smooth and relatively trouble-free re-entry into their families, and that they all resume their lives so that this incident fades away into distant memory, except for the added preciousness it gives the rest of their days together.
One of the worst things on earth to imagine--and, fortunately, for most parents, it's an event that remains in the realm of imagination--is the disappearance of a child. For the Akers, 15-year old Shawn Hornbeck's family, it's been a gut-wrenching, heart-breaking, four-year struggle in which they've dedicated their lives to finding their kidnapped son, and to other missing children. And now their faith, hope, prayers, and work have been rewarded.
For 13-year old Ben Ownby's family, it was "only" a week of suffering. A week that probably lasted twenty lifetimes, all of them bad.
Amidst the joy, one caveat: the reentry, especially for Hornbeck, will probably not be smooth. I am reminded of another story, that of Steven Stayner, who was kidnapped in the early '70s at the age of seven (much younger than these boys) by a pedophile, and kept for over seven years.
Stayner's captor used sophisticated methods of "re-education" on him, convincing the boy that his parents had forgotten about him and didn't want him back, sexually abusing him, and encouraging him to regard him as his new father. Stayner was only found when his kidnapper hauled in new prey, a young child for whom Stayner developed a feeling of compassionate protectiveness. He planned to guide the boy to a police station, but the child was fearful and wanted Stayner to go in with him. In doing so, Stayner himself was detained, and the entire story ended up spilling out.
But Stayner's re-entry into his joyful family was fraught with psychological problems for all concerned, some of them detailed in an unusually fine made-for-TV film entitled, "I Know My First Name Is Steven" (the words Stayner voiced to the police when he was first being interrogated.) There was a book, as well.
The problems were not surprising considering the dreadful trauma and dislocation all had endured--the fact that they had lost a young child and yet a teenager was returned to them, one who'd seen and endured things no child should ever have to face.
Stayner married young and had two children, but tragically, was killed in a motorcycle accident when he was only twenty-four. But the tragedy doesn't end there.
Decades later, his brother Cary Stayner was found guilty of the 1999 murders of four women in Yosemite National Park, where Cary worked at the time. The vicious murders had gripped the nation, and I was glad to hear the news that the killer had been found. But when I heard the perpetrator's identity, I couldn't help but think of Stayner's parents as well, who had emerged from one long nightmare only to enter another, and then another.
It is highly unlikely that the present case will lead to anything remotely like that. I make no excuses for serial murderers, but one still wonders just how much the kidnapping of his brother and the family trauma affected the elder Stayner boy. It certainly is not the case that something like that causes a person to become serial murderer; that much is certain. But it is also true that those who kidnap children harm far more people than those children themselves. They set up a ripple effect with a long reach.
But today is a day of rejoicing. And I add my hopes that these two kidnapped boys have a smooth and relatively trouble-free re-entry into their families, and that they all resume their lives so that this incident fades away into distant memory, except for the added preciousness it gives the rest of their days together.
Nyamko Sabuni: an Afro-Swedish breath of fresh air
Who's Nyamko Sabuni? She's the new Swedish Minister for Integration and Gender Equality.
Sounds awfully PC, doesn't it? But Sabuni is anything but. In fact, she's already raised a storm of controversy in Sweden with her statements on the subject of assimilation.
Sabuni herself has impeccably PC credentials, a fact that probably infuriates her enemies, much as the African-American-ness of Condoleezza Rice or Bill Cosby infuriate their Leftist critics in a special way. Her father was a political refugee from the Congo to Zaire and then Sweden, jailed in his native country for opposing the government. Sabuni was twelve when she made the journey to Sweden with her family, learned the language, and thrived in her new environment.
Her father is Christian and her mother Muslim, but Sabuni herself was raised without religion (although Wikipedia's entry on Sabuni has a different tale to tell than the NY Times on her parents--it says both are Muslim).
What has Sabuni done to ruffle so many feathers? Oh, just a couple of little things: called for a ban on wearing the veil for girls under fifteen, proposed that schoolgirls be checked for evidence of genital mutilation, criticized "honor culture" mentalities, and asked that arranged marriages and the state financing of religious schools be banned.
It's hard to argue with the fact that the institution of such policies might indeed foster "integration and gender equality" in Sweden. Nor do they run counter to the prevailing customs of Sweden. But argument most certainly has been mounted; Sabuni is considered unsympathetic to the plight of immigrants (read: Muslim immigrants), despite her own status as an immigrant and daughter of Muslim[s].
Sabuni, who calls herself "Afro-Swedish, maybe," answers her critics thusly:
We have a society that has failed to adapt to new times. We don’t offer people their rights, but we are also unclear about their obligations. So people end up in a kind of no man’s land, where they are neither Swedes, nor Turks nor Congolese.
Hmmm--with rights come obligations. And immigrants to Sweden should end up becoming--Swedes! How revolutionary is that?
{NOTE: Peaktalk wrote an interesting post on Sabuni back in October.]
Sounds awfully PC, doesn't it? But Sabuni is anything but. In fact, she's already raised a storm of controversy in Sweden with her statements on the subject of assimilation.
Sabuni herself has impeccably PC credentials, a fact that probably infuriates her enemies, much as the African-American-ness of Condoleezza Rice or Bill Cosby infuriate their Leftist critics in a special way. Her father was a political refugee from the Congo to Zaire and then Sweden, jailed in his native country for opposing the government. Sabuni was twelve when she made the journey to Sweden with her family, learned the language, and thrived in her new environment.
Her father is Christian and her mother Muslim, but Sabuni herself was raised without religion (although Wikipedia's entry on Sabuni has a different tale to tell than the NY Times on her parents--it says both are Muslim).
What has Sabuni done to ruffle so many feathers? Oh, just a couple of little things: called for a ban on wearing the veil for girls under fifteen, proposed that schoolgirls be checked for evidence of genital mutilation, criticized "honor culture" mentalities, and asked that arranged marriages and the state financing of religious schools be banned.
It's hard to argue with the fact that the institution of such policies might indeed foster "integration and gender equality" in Sweden. Nor do they run counter to the prevailing customs of Sweden. But argument most certainly has been mounted; Sabuni is considered unsympathetic to the plight of immigrants (read: Muslim immigrants), despite her own status as an immigrant and daughter of Muslim[s].
Sabuni, who calls herself "Afro-Swedish, maybe," answers her critics thusly:
We have a society that has failed to adapt to new times. We don’t offer people their rights, but we are also unclear about their obligations. So people end up in a kind of no man’s land, where they are neither Swedes, nor Turks nor Congolese.
Hmmm--with rights come obligations. And immigrants to Sweden should end up becoming--Swedes! How revolutionary is that?
{NOTE: Peaktalk wrote an interesting post on Sabuni back in October.]
Friday, January 12, 2007
About cutting off those war funds: beware the veto
The news is replete with stories about how the Democrats and some moderate Republicans are against Bush's "surge." And many articles also suggest that Congress might even be prepared to cut off funding for the military, or specific funding for that mission, in order to stop it.
This article, more detailed than most, explains some of the legal ramifications of such an act. It's certainly possible to do it, as evidenced by what Congress did during the 70s vis a vis Vietnam (see here for some of that history).
However, one rather large difference between Then and Now is the size of the support in Congress for such a tactic. Since any such cutoff of funds would of course be vetoed by President Bush, therefore its sponsors would need two-thirds support in Congress for an override.
If they don't have that, they might try it anyway, of course--just to get everyone on record as "pro" or "con" for use in the next election. But it would not be implemented; the vote would be an act of protest that would have no repercussions as far as funding itself (the only repercussions would probably be the satisfaction the enemy would feel in the knowledge that, once Bush is gone, they'd be relatively unopposed by a weary US).
In the 70s President Nixon, and then President Ford who followed him, were facing a Congress more strongly Democratic (and even more antiwar on the Republican side, as I recall) than Bush faces at the moment (see here for the history of the composition of the House, and here for the Senate). They knew that acts of such Congresses were practically veto-proof.
I've not noticed any head counts in present-day articles to indicate whether the votes are there for an override. My guess is that they are not. But I'd be interested on any information on that score.
This article, more detailed than most, explains some of the legal ramifications of such an act. It's certainly possible to do it, as evidenced by what Congress did during the 70s vis a vis Vietnam (see here for some of that history).
However, one rather large difference between Then and Now is the size of the support in Congress for such a tactic. Since any such cutoff of funds would of course be vetoed by President Bush, therefore its sponsors would need two-thirds support in Congress for an override.
If they don't have that, they might try it anyway, of course--just to get everyone on record as "pro" or "con" for use in the next election. But it would not be implemented; the vote would be an act of protest that would have no repercussions as far as funding itself (the only repercussions would probably be the satisfaction the enemy would feel in the knowledge that, once Bush is gone, they'd be relatively unopposed by a weary US).
In the 70s President Nixon, and then President Ford who followed him, were facing a Congress more strongly Democratic (and even more antiwar on the Republican side, as I recall) than Bush faces at the moment (see here for the history of the composition of the House, and here for the Senate). They knew that acts of such Congresses were practically veto-proof.
I've not noticed any head counts in present-day articles to indicate whether the votes are there for an override. My guess is that they are not. But I'd be interested on any information on that score.
The MSM and the not-so-subtle art of writing the lede
I could probably spend all my time on this blog just analyzing the myriad variations on one theme: how the MSM skews the news by editorializing when it should just be reporting.
Sometimes it's done overtly. Far more often, though, it's a relatively subtle use of language and--if you'll forgive the expression--nuance. But once you know where/how to look--well then, like Chickenman, it's everywhere, it's everywhere (those who were anywhere near Chicago and a radio in the late 60s know what I'm referring to by that phrase).
Here's today's example from the NY Times: an article about Tony Blair (the first one I looked at when I clicked on their website) entitled "Blair Urges Europe to Stay Aggressive Abroad." The headline is actually one of the better ones (although I'd prefer the substitution of the words "vigilant" or "militarily prepared" for "aggressive").
It's the lede that's so "interesting." Here it is:
As he seeks to define his legacy and stamp his imprint on the future, Prime Minister Tony Blair urged his successors today to maintain the warlike foreign policy that he promoted, sending troops into battle in Africa and the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.
An excellent example of the approach the media has used for some years now, what I'll call the "what's in it for me?" outlook. A prime minister or president is always regarded as a self-serving, narcissistic politician rather than a statesman (is this word even in the vocabulary of the MSM any more?).
Of course, politicians do tend to be narcissists, and concerned with their own images. It goes with the territory. But to report, in a straight news article, on a speech by Blair about the central defining worldwide issue of our times--the current war against Islamist totalitarianism--as though Blair's primary concern is his himself and his legacy (oh, how I've grown to hate that word!) is a profoundly cynical and destructive way of looking at things.
It would be different if the article were actually about
Does this sound like the speech of a guy obsessed with himself?:
The frontiers of our security no longer stop at the Channel. What happens in the Middle East affects us. What happens in Pakistan, or Indonesia, or in the attenuated struggles for territory and supremacy in Africa for example, in Sudan or Somalia--the new frontiers for our security are global...It has taken a generation for the enemy to grow. It will, in all probability, take a generation to defeat.
Sounds like a reasonable assessment of a sobering situation, by a man concerned with the future, yes--the future of his country, Western civilization, and the world.
Sometimes it's done overtly. Far more often, though, it's a relatively subtle use of language and--if you'll forgive the expression--nuance. But once you know where/how to look--well then, like Chickenman, it's everywhere, it's everywhere (those who were anywhere near Chicago and a radio in the late 60s know what I'm referring to by that phrase).
Here's today's example from the NY Times: an article about Tony Blair (the first one I looked at when I clicked on their website) entitled "Blair Urges Europe to Stay Aggressive Abroad." The headline is actually one of the better ones (although I'd prefer the substitution of the words "vigilant" or "militarily prepared" for "aggressive").
It's the lede that's so "interesting." Here it is:
As he seeks to define his legacy and stamp his imprint on the future, Prime Minister Tony Blair urged his successors today to maintain the warlike foreign policy that he promoted, sending troops into battle in Africa and the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.
An excellent example of the approach the media has used for some years now, what I'll call the "what's in it for me?" outlook. A prime minister or president is always regarded as a self-serving, narcissistic politician rather than a statesman (is this word even in the vocabulary of the MSM any more?).
Of course, politicians do tend to be narcissists, and concerned with their own images. It goes with the territory. But to report, in a straight news article, on a speech by Blair about the central defining worldwide issue of our times--the current war against Islamist totalitarianism--as though Blair's primary concern is his himself and his legacy (oh, how I've grown to hate that word!) is a profoundly cynical and destructive way of looking at things.
It would be different if the article were actually about
Does this sound like the speech of a guy obsessed with himself?:
The frontiers of our security no longer stop at the Channel. What happens in the Middle East affects us. What happens in Pakistan, or Indonesia, or in the attenuated struggles for territory and supremacy in Africa for example, in Sudan or Somalia--the new frontiers for our security are global...It has taken a generation for the enemy to grow. It will, in all probability, take a generation to defeat.
Sounds like a reasonable assessment of a sobering situation, by a man concerned with the future, yes--the future of his country, Western civilization, and the world.
Thursday, January 11, 2007
Telegraphing the plan
This is my question: doesn't a speech like Bush's, in which a strategic plan is outlined, give the enemy the advantage of knowing in advance what the approach will be, and take away any element of surprise? True, the details aren't known; but the broad outline is.
Democracies demand such things, especially modern democracies. But it seems to be a potential problem of some magnitude in waging any war, conventional or assymetrical, does it not?
Democracies demand such things, especially modern democracies. But it seems to be a potential problem of some magnitude in waging any war, conventional or assymetrical, does it not?
Bush's talk: we can and will, if we can and will
[NOTE: The full text of Bush's speech can be found here.]
Bush's speech last night was a tight and subdued performance in terms of rhetoric and delivery. But, what else is new? Although a Churchillian sweep and grandeur would be awfully nice, it's not going to be forthcoming, not from this guy. That's not my main concern.
In content, it sounded okay to me. But what do I know? I'm just an evil bloodthirsty Bush-worshipping neocon warmonger, out to kill as many Iraqis and members of the US armed forces as humanly possible.
Seriously, folks (and no, the third sentence of the above paragraph of mine was not serious, although some would take issue with me on that), what Bush has proposed seems more than a simple "surge." Those who hate and distrust him will consider his speech mere words, just more of the same old same old. And it's true, speeches are always "mere words;" the only thing that matters is action and results.
But those of us (myself included) who believe that although Bush and his generals have made errors, such errors are not only common in all wars, but especially unavoidable in a counterinsurgency/assymetrical-warfare/nation-building situation such as that in Iraq, and will give the plan the benefit of the doubt and let it play out.
Because, make no mistake about it, it is exceptionally important that the situation in Iraq be stabilized. As Bush said, if we withdraw:
Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and...would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people.
There are some interesting possibilities hidden in the speech as almost throwaway lines. One is this:
[Previously t]here were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes.
Without actually using the phrase "rules of engagment," it sounds as though these restrictive and controversial rules have been--or are about to be--expanded and changed. This is huge, if it happens.
What's different about the counter-insurgency methods? According to Bush, now we will have enough forces to stay and hold after clearing neighborhoods; before we could not. (After the speech, I watched Major-General Bob Scales explain details of force ratios, and why this plan has a decent chance of succeeding where previous ones failed.) There was also a suggestion by Bush that troop levels will be increased across the board, not just in Iraq.
For me, one of the strongest parts of the speech was this:
This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering.
Sadly, he is correct there. The strength of our enemy is that it has realized our deep susceptibility to casualties and media reports of bloodshed. We are a compassionate society, not a hardened one, and such sensitivity is ordinarily a good thing. But in this war against an enemy that cares not one whit about such bloodshed and even feeds on it, these emotions on the part of Western society are cynically exploited and turned against us. Our compassion has become (to borrow a phrase from Churchill) our "soft underbelly," the very best way to attack us.
Bush asks for patience and resolve on the part of the nation. I doubt he'll get it, especially from those Democrats bound and determined to oppose him and withdraw ASAP. Consequences of such an abandonment? They don't need no steenking consequences.
After the speech, I was watching a Fox News interview with Newt Gingrich, not one of my favorites for his role as Speaker in the 90s. But I liked this: when asked "What part should polls play in military strategy decisions?" Newt answered (correctly, I believe), "None," and cited appropriate historical references (Lincoln, for example). He then went on to say that, when the people are fed a steady diet of despair, they respond to what they've heard; and that, if this approach brings victory, a year from now the polls will be quite different.
Bush's speech was sobering and comprehensive: he acknowledged mistakes, made it clear how important success is, described details and strategy, was realistic about the long hard fight ahead, attempted to define success, and declared limits on what we'll give Iraq if they don't cooperate. But, as Bill Kristol said in an interview later (paraphrasing here): the plan is more important than the speech, and the implementation of the plan is more important than the plan.
As for me, I deeply wish Bush had done this before. What took him so long? Why did it require the Republican loss of the election to motivate him to hatch a new plan? That's one of Bush's biggest flaws. Call it loyalty, call it stubbornness, call it whatever you want--he waited too long. I hope the wait has not been fatal to victory; it certainly has hampered and delayed it.
One of Lincoln's strengths was that he was able to change a strategy that was not succeeding. His grasp of military matters was apparently unusual for a civilian. Like all wars, the Civil War differed in some respects from those that had gone before it, and innovations were required to meet new challenges. But it was still essentially a conventional war, with armies arrayed on battlefields, and territory lost and won.
The current war, featuring assymetrical warfare against this particular enemy, seems as though it may be more profoundly different than what's gone before in the long sweep of history, although in some ways it does resemble other long-drawn-out conflicts such as Vietnam and Algeria (especially in the terrorist tactics of the enemy). Those who expect an easy or textbook victory will be disappointed and angry, ready to pull out and abandon Iraq as good riddance to bad business. As Bush said:
It can be tempting to think that America can put aside the burdens of freedom... Now America is engaged in a new struggle that will set the course for a new century.
And then he added:
We can and we will prevail.
We will, if we have the will to do so.
Bush's speech last night was a tight and subdued performance in terms of rhetoric and delivery. But, what else is new? Although a Churchillian sweep and grandeur would be awfully nice, it's not going to be forthcoming, not from this guy. That's not my main concern.
In content, it sounded okay to me. But what do I know? I'm just an evil bloodthirsty Bush-worshipping neocon warmonger, out to kill as many Iraqis and members of the US armed forces as humanly possible.
Seriously, folks (and no, the third sentence of the above paragraph of mine was not serious, although some would take issue with me on that), what Bush has proposed seems more than a simple "surge." Those who hate and distrust him will consider his speech mere words, just more of the same old same old. And it's true, speeches are always "mere words;" the only thing that matters is action and results.
But those of us (myself included) who believe that although Bush and his generals have made errors, such errors are not only common in all wars, but especially unavoidable in a counterinsurgency/assymetrical-warfare/nation-building situation such as that in Iraq, and will give the plan the benefit of the doubt and let it play out.
Because, make no mistake about it, it is exceptionally important that the situation in Iraq be stabilized. As Bush said, if we withdraw:
Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and...would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people.
There are some interesting possibilities hidden in the speech as almost throwaway lines. One is this:
[Previously t]here were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes.
Without actually using the phrase "rules of engagment," it sounds as though these restrictive and controversial rules have been--or are about to be--expanded and changed. This is huge, if it happens.
What's different about the counter-insurgency methods? According to Bush, now we will have enough forces to stay and hold after clearing neighborhoods; before we could not. (After the speech, I watched Major-General Bob Scales explain details of force ratios, and why this plan has a decent chance of succeeding where previous ones failed.) There was also a suggestion by Bush that troop levels will be increased across the board, not just in Iraq.
For me, one of the strongest parts of the speech was this:
This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering.
Sadly, he is correct there. The strength of our enemy is that it has realized our deep susceptibility to casualties and media reports of bloodshed. We are a compassionate society, not a hardened one, and such sensitivity is ordinarily a good thing. But in this war against an enemy that cares not one whit about such bloodshed and even feeds on it, these emotions on the part of Western society are cynically exploited and turned against us. Our compassion has become (to borrow a phrase from Churchill) our "soft underbelly," the very best way to attack us.
Bush asks for patience and resolve on the part of the nation. I doubt he'll get it, especially from those Democrats bound and determined to oppose him and withdraw ASAP. Consequences of such an abandonment? They don't need no steenking consequences.
After the speech, I was watching a Fox News interview with Newt Gingrich, not one of my favorites for his role as Speaker in the 90s. But I liked this: when asked "What part should polls play in military strategy decisions?" Newt answered (correctly, I believe), "None," and cited appropriate historical references (Lincoln, for example). He then went on to say that, when the people are fed a steady diet of despair, they respond to what they've heard; and that, if this approach brings victory, a year from now the polls will be quite different.
Bush's speech was sobering and comprehensive: he acknowledged mistakes, made it clear how important success is, described details and strategy, was realistic about the long hard fight ahead, attempted to define success, and declared limits on what we'll give Iraq if they don't cooperate. But, as Bill Kristol said in an interview later (paraphrasing here): the plan is more important than the speech, and the implementation of the plan is more important than the plan.
As for me, I deeply wish Bush had done this before. What took him so long? Why did it require the Republican loss of the election to motivate him to hatch a new plan? That's one of Bush's biggest flaws. Call it loyalty, call it stubbornness, call it whatever you want--he waited too long. I hope the wait has not been fatal to victory; it certainly has hampered and delayed it.
One of Lincoln's strengths was that he was able to change a strategy that was not succeeding. His grasp of military matters was apparently unusual for a civilian. Like all wars, the Civil War differed in some respects from those that had gone before it, and innovations were required to meet new challenges. But it was still essentially a conventional war, with armies arrayed on battlefields, and territory lost and won.
The current war, featuring assymetrical warfare against this particular enemy, seems as though it may be more profoundly different than what's gone before in the long sweep of history, although in some ways it does resemble other long-drawn-out conflicts such as Vietnam and Algeria (especially in the terrorist tactics of the enemy). Those who expect an easy or textbook victory will be disappointed and angry, ready to pull out and abandon Iraq as good riddance to bad business. As Bush said:
It can be tempting to think that America can put aside the burdens of freedom... Now America is engaged in a new struggle that will set the course for a new century.
And then he added:
We can and we will prevail.
We will, if we have the will to do so.
Sophia's available: now get in line, all you guys of a certain age
Sophia Loren's husband Carlo Ponti has died at the age of 94 (hat tip: Pajamas Media).
Sophia made my list of ten all-time favorite movie stars back in May of 2005. She was (well, I suppose she still is, but I haven't seen a movie of hers in decades) that rarest of rara aves: a sex symbol, a comedienne, and a serious actress, all in roughly equal measure.
Apparently she's an intelligent and witty woman, as well. Her marriage to Ponti--one most people would not have bet on for longevity, back when she was 23 and he, at 45, had left his first wife and defied Italy's restrictive divorce laws to wed Loren in Mexico by proxy--withstood the test of time.
Ponti and Loren were one of those odd couples whose attraction to each other was somewhat opaque to outsiders (that is, of course, hers to him. His to her was plain enough). He must have been a charming and charismatic man, however, at the very least.
I especially liked the Loren-Mastroianni cinema combination. In "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," as well as the wonderful-but-virtually-unobtainable-on-video "Marriage, Italian Style," she showed her comedic talents as well as her physical assets.
But it was her Oscar-winning performance in "Two Women" (produced by Ponti, as were so many of her films) that was a revelation. I saw it when I was very young--perhaps too young. But I couldn't help but be awed by the deeply emotional and yet utterly naturalistic performance of Loren as a mother trying (and failing) to protect her daughter from the chaos of war.
At any rate, the statuesque Loren and the diminutive Ponti had been married for nearly fifty years when he died, a record unusual for anyone these days, and almost unheard of for a star. One thing is certain: Loren's loyalty to Ponti wasn't for lack of opportunity: Cary Grant fell head over heels in love with her, to name just one of many.
But I think this sums it up best, found at Loren's Wikipedia biography:
The Archbishop of Genoa once said that although the Vatican opposed human cloning, "an exception might be made in the case of Sophia Loren."
[ADDENDUM: By the way, when I was looking up Mastroianni I discovered in the Wiki article that he himself was married close to fifty years, to one women. However, in classic marriage, Italian-style, he had a longtime mistress, with whom he had a child. The name of said mistress? Catherine Deneuve. Poor guy.]
Sophia made my list of ten all-time favorite movie stars back in May of 2005. She was (well, I suppose she still is, but I haven't seen a movie of hers in decades) that rarest of rara aves: a sex symbol, a comedienne, and a serious actress, all in roughly equal measure.
Apparently she's an intelligent and witty woman, as well. Her marriage to Ponti--one most people would not have bet on for longevity, back when she was 23 and he, at 45, had left his first wife and defied Italy's restrictive divorce laws to wed Loren in Mexico by proxy--withstood the test of time.
Ponti and Loren were one of those odd couples whose attraction to each other was somewhat opaque to outsiders (that is, of course, hers to him. His to her was plain enough). He must have been a charming and charismatic man, however, at the very least.
I especially liked the Loren-Mastroianni cinema combination. In "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," as well as the wonderful-but-virtually-unobtainable-on-video "Marriage, Italian Style," she showed her comedic talents as well as her physical assets.
But it was her Oscar-winning performance in "Two Women" (produced by Ponti, as were so many of her films) that was a revelation. I saw it when I was very young--perhaps too young. But I couldn't help but be awed by the deeply emotional and yet utterly naturalistic performance of Loren as a mother trying (and failing) to protect her daughter from the chaos of war.
At any rate, the statuesque Loren and the diminutive Ponti had been married for nearly fifty years when he died, a record unusual for anyone these days, and almost unheard of for a star. One thing is certain: Loren's loyalty to Ponti wasn't for lack of opportunity: Cary Grant fell head over heels in love with her, to name just one of many.
But I think this sums it up best, found at Loren's Wikipedia biography:
The Archbishop of Genoa once said that although the Vatican opposed human cloning, "an exception might be made in the case of Sophia Loren."
[ADDENDUM: By the way, when I was looking up Mastroianni I discovered in the Wiki article that he himself was married close to fifty years, to one women. However, in classic marriage, Italian-style, he had a longtime mistress, with whom he had a child. The name of said mistress? Catherine Deneuve. Poor guy.]
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
"Some Iraqis Express Doubts About New US Strategy:" why, who woulda thunk it?
Here's a wonderful headline that caught my eye, from, of all things, the Voice of America: "Some Iraqis express doubts about new US strategy."
Why, goodness gracious me my, they do? I'm so astonished I hardly know where to begin. But I'll try.
I've noticed lately (and by "lately," I don't mean in the last few days, I mean during the last decade or so) a growing propensity for the media to chew, swallow, digest, and excrete a story before it has even happened. A good example of the genre was the ISG report--remember that? Heard much of the report lately? No; despite the pre-report hype, it died a merciful death shortly after its release because it was so--to be blunt--profoundly stupid and misguided in its suggestion of negotiation with Iran and Syria, the biggest of a couple of whoppers that didn't sit well most segments of US public, political, or pundit opinion.
And now it remains to be seen whether Bush's new plan for Iraq, when announced tonight, will be the same one the media has been discussing endlessly. My guess, by the way, is that at least the broad outlines will be similar; I'm not sure about the details. Maybe it's just me, but wouldn't it be awfully nice to wait and see what the man actually says before we get incessant, 24-hour a day, worldwide coverage of the reaction to it?
In addition, this particular story struck me as especially meaningless, and transparently so. It is the quintessential "dog bites man" story--after all, a certain segment of a population is going to have an opinion pro or con virtually anything. Just listen to the late-night program "Coast to Coast" (I seldom do, but every now and then I turn it on for a moment) to get an idea of how many people believe, oh, in just about any wacky theory anyone can dream up.
Now, don't get me wrong. Having doubts about the new US strategy is most definitely not akin to thinking the earth is flat, that we never got to the moon, or that Jesus was a mushroom (the latter was the subject of one especially flabbergasting "Coast to Coast" segment I happened to flip onto late one night. Ten minutes were quite enough, thanks you, but they were memorable.)
And as for doubts--well, even I have doubts about Bush's strategy, whatever it might be. Doubts are part of human existence, especially in war. I've quoted Helmuth von Motke the Elder's (love that name!) famous dictum before, but I'll do it again: No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.
And I am certain that the average Iraqi has plenty of doubts at this point about a plan he/she doesn't know the details of yet, that hasn't been implemented, and that follows so many dashed hopes raised by previous campaigns and promises. This is news?
The Voice of America article hits some sort of reporting low--at least, I hope it's a low. It quotes three average unnamed Iraqis as expressing some rather reasonable-sounding reservations, then mentions the official Iraqi government line that states the plan will succeed (surprise, surprise!).
Why am I picking on this particular obscure story? Well, for one thing, I found it in the first place because it was highlighted by Google as one of its top stories for today, so it's getting an awful lot of attention relative to any merit it might have. For another, even though it's an extreme example, it shows the naked media tendency towards shaping the news in a negative and often meaningless way: write a headline that makes it look as though Iraqis have already rejected Bush's plan (and perhaps they have, but you wouldn't know it based on the evidence in this story), do a cursory job of interviewing a couple of people who subscribe to the views you're seeking, and call it a day.
Why, goodness gracious me my, they do? I'm so astonished I hardly know where to begin. But I'll try.
I've noticed lately (and by "lately," I don't mean in the last few days, I mean during the last decade or so) a growing propensity for the media to chew, swallow, digest, and excrete a story before it has even happened. A good example of the genre was the ISG report--remember that? Heard much of the report lately? No; despite the pre-report hype, it died a merciful death shortly after its release because it was so--to be blunt--profoundly stupid and misguided in its suggestion of negotiation with Iran and Syria, the biggest of a couple of whoppers that didn't sit well most segments of US public, political, or pundit opinion.
And now it remains to be seen whether Bush's new plan for Iraq, when announced tonight, will be the same one the media has been discussing endlessly. My guess, by the way, is that at least the broad outlines will be similar; I'm not sure about the details. Maybe it's just me, but wouldn't it be awfully nice to wait and see what the man actually says before we get incessant, 24-hour a day, worldwide coverage of the reaction to it?
In addition, this particular story struck me as especially meaningless, and transparently so. It is the quintessential "dog bites man" story--after all, a certain segment of a population is going to have an opinion pro or con virtually anything. Just listen to the late-night program "Coast to Coast" (I seldom do, but every now and then I turn it on for a moment) to get an idea of how many people believe, oh, in just about any wacky theory anyone can dream up.
Now, don't get me wrong. Having doubts about the new US strategy is most definitely not akin to thinking the earth is flat, that we never got to the moon, or that Jesus was a mushroom (the latter was the subject of one especially flabbergasting "Coast to Coast" segment I happened to flip onto late one night. Ten minutes were quite enough, thanks you, but they were memorable.)
And as for doubts--well, even I have doubts about Bush's strategy, whatever it might be. Doubts are part of human existence, especially in war. I've quoted Helmuth von Motke the Elder's (love that name!) famous dictum before, but I'll do it again: No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.
And I am certain that the average Iraqi has plenty of doubts at this point about a plan he/she doesn't know the details of yet, that hasn't been implemented, and that follows so many dashed hopes raised by previous campaigns and promises. This is news?
The Voice of America article hits some sort of reporting low--at least, I hope it's a low. It quotes three average unnamed Iraqis as expressing some rather reasonable-sounding reservations, then mentions the official Iraqi government line that states the plan will succeed (surprise, surprise!).
Why am I picking on this particular obscure story? Well, for one thing, I found it in the first place because it was highlighted by Google as one of its top stories for today, so it's getting an awful lot of attention relative to any merit it might have. For another, even though it's an extreme example, it shows the naked media tendency towards shaping the news in a negative and often meaningless way: write a headline that makes it look as though Iraqis have already rejected Bush's plan (and perhaps they have, but you wouldn't know it based on the evidence in this story), do a cursory job of interviewing a couple of people who subscribe to the views you're seeking, and call it a day.
They say there's no bad publicity: Pajamas makes the Times (sort of)
In this story about how bloggers won't let go of the controversy over the existence of quoted AP source Jamil Hussein, Maria Aspen writes (in the business section of the NY Times):
In a reference to a memorable swipe that Jonathan Klein, CNN’s head of domestic operations, once took at bloggers who work from their living rooms, Ms. Wagner wrote in an e-mail message: "Our reporters are not 'pajamas media.' "
She added, "Our reporters tell what they’ve seen and heard to editors who ask tougher questions than many of these bloggers might imagine."
Oh, I dunno; I can imagine some pretty tough questions, although not maybe NY Times-tough or AP-tough. "Have you stopped beating your wife?" for example. Or even, "Do you have independent corroboration of this source?"
Be that as it may, I have a sneaking suspicion that, unbeknownst to Ms. Aspen, Ms. Wagner's reference was a double one--not just to Klein's original memorable (and sexist!! Let's not forget sexist!) statement ("You couldn't have a starker contrast between the multiple layers of check and balances [at '60 Minutes'] and a guy sitting in his living room in his pajamas writing.") , but to the media group of which I'm a proud member, Pajamas Media.
They say there's no bad publicity, but unfortunately, Ms. Aspen doesn't seem to have heard of Pajamas; my guess is that Ms. Wagner has.
In a reference to a memorable swipe that Jonathan Klein, CNN’s head of domestic operations, once took at bloggers who work from their living rooms, Ms. Wagner wrote in an e-mail message: "Our reporters are not 'pajamas media.' "
She added, "Our reporters tell what they’ve seen and heard to editors who ask tougher questions than many of these bloggers might imagine."
Oh, I dunno; I can imagine some pretty tough questions, although not maybe NY Times-tough or AP-tough. "Have you stopped beating your wife?" for example. Or even, "Do you have independent corroboration of this source?"
Be that as it may, I have a sneaking suspicion that, unbeknownst to Ms. Aspen, Ms. Wagner's reference was a double one--not just to Klein's original memorable (and sexist!! Let's not forget sexist!) statement ("You couldn't have a starker contrast between the multiple layers of check and balances [at '60 Minutes'] and a guy sitting in his living room in his pajamas writing.") , but to the media group of which I'm a proud member, Pajamas Media.
They say there's no bad publicity, but unfortunately, Ms. Aspen doesn't seem to have heard of Pajamas; my guess is that Ms. Wagner has.
The Squad tees off...
...on Congress's reaction to Bush's Iraq plan (before he's announced it), utopia and tyranny, self-defense, and a myriad of other assorted issues. It's me, sans cold; Siggy; Dr. Sanity; and Shrink. Join us.
Tuesday, January 09, 2007
Now, here's a Democrat who makes sense
I like Joe Donnelly's style.
Who's Joe Donnelly? A very freshman US Congressman from Indiana, one of the Blue Dog Democrats (in fact, being a freshman, Donnelly might better be called a "blue pup"--and no, I didn't make the term up, as you'll see if you follow the link).
Donnelly isn't all that pleased with Nancy Pelosi. Nor is he--despite his "pup" status--all that awed by Ms. Speaker:
If Pelosi "goes too far one way or another, we're not coming back," Donnelly says. He sees his party's victory in the November elections as less an endorsement of its agenda than a rejection of Republican rule: "People just got real tired of this bunch, and they fired them."
It turns out that there are thirty Blue Dogs in the House right now. And it also turns out that the Democrats outnumber the Republicans there by a margin of thirty-one. So you don't need to be a math wizard to see that those Blue Dogs are the key to the whole thing for the Democrats.
In recent decades it seems that, more and more, each party's leaders tend to come from the more extreme wings of their respective parties. And it's the nature of such politicians to look on any victory as a mandate for their point of view. But--as I've said before--ignore the law of thirds at your peril.
Pelosi may be in the act of making the Newt Gingrich error. Coming on so strong against whatever plan Bush announces for Iraq might not only be counterproductive in terms of the war itself, and the world's perception of our will and our ability to keep our word--but it may even be counterproductive in terms of what Pelosi really seems to care about, victory for the Democrats in '08.
I'll let Donnelly, no Bush sycophant (Donnelly refers to the war in Iraq as a "disaster"), have the last word on this one:
[Donnelly] doesn't support the fixed timetable for withdrawal proposed by Pennsylvania Democrat John Murtha that Pelosi, 66, has endorsed. Instead, like Bush, he opposes any withdrawal until Iraq is ``stabilized.''
"My goal is to help the president," he said in an interview. "I am not going to rip him to shreds. If he does a better job, then our soldiers can be more successful, Iraq can be stabilized and our troops can come home."
Works for me.
Who's Joe Donnelly? A very freshman US Congressman from Indiana, one of the Blue Dog Democrats (in fact, being a freshman, Donnelly might better be called a "blue pup"--and no, I didn't make the term up, as you'll see if you follow the link).
Donnelly isn't all that pleased with Nancy Pelosi. Nor is he--despite his "pup" status--all that awed by Ms. Speaker:
If Pelosi "goes too far one way or another, we're not coming back," Donnelly says. He sees his party's victory in the November elections as less an endorsement of its agenda than a rejection of Republican rule: "People just got real tired of this bunch, and they fired them."
It turns out that there are thirty Blue Dogs in the House right now. And it also turns out that the Democrats outnumber the Republicans there by a margin of thirty-one. So you don't need to be a math wizard to see that those Blue Dogs are the key to the whole thing for the Democrats.
In recent decades it seems that, more and more, each party's leaders tend to come from the more extreme wings of their respective parties. And it's the nature of such politicians to look on any victory as a mandate for their point of view. But--as I've said before--ignore the law of thirds at your peril.
Pelosi may be in the act of making the Newt Gingrich error. Coming on so strong against whatever plan Bush announces for Iraq might not only be counterproductive in terms of the war itself, and the world's perception of our will and our ability to keep our word--but it may even be counterproductive in terms of what Pelosi really seems to care about, victory for the Democrats in '08.
I'll let Donnelly, no Bush sycophant (Donnelly refers to the war in Iraq as a "disaster"), have the last word on this one:
[Donnelly] doesn't support the fixed timetable for withdrawal proposed by Pennsylvania Democrat John Murtha that Pelosi, 66, has endorsed. Instead, like Bush, he opposes any withdrawal until Iraq is ``stabilized.''
"My goal is to help the president," he said in an interview. "I am not going to rip him to shreds. If he does a better job, then our soldiers can be more successful, Iraq can be stabilized and our troops can come home."
Works for me.
Monday, January 08, 2007
"A Jewish veneer for the annihilation of Jews"
They're a fringe, it's true--but a fringe that detractors of Israel have made much of.
I'm speaking of the ultra-orthodox religious Jews who are anti-Zionist. That's their prerogative, of course; eveyone's entitled to his/her opinion, yada yada yada.
But some of them go further then that; in fact, it turns out that six of the delegates to the mid-December 2006 Iranian Holocaust denial conference were such Jews. Collaborating with an Iran bent on the destruction of Israel and Jews is quite a stretch.
And, amidst the hatefest that the conference represented, you can be sure that those Jews were not ignored by the press. In fact, they were highlighted in many instances. Granted, it's a sort of "man bites dog" story, inherently both fascinating and shocking--but still.
For example, several British papers had articles on the conference that featured only one photo illustrating the event. What visuals did they see fit to show? You guessed it; only the anti-Zionist Orthodox Jews (see this, for example).
It's hard to know quite what to say about this one. I'll start by simply quoting it:
[Austrian rabbi Moshe Friedman] noted, "We should focus on the reality that the behind-the-curtain individuals and financial providers as well as perpetrators of some of the World War II crimes had been Zionists themselves." Now another Holocaust has taken place, this time involving Palestinians and Arabs -- something unprecedented in history, he added.
The Austrian Rabbi also thanked Iran as the best venue for the conference on the Holocaust because it used to remain neutral during the World War II and was not involved in the event.
Friedman described Iran as a model country in dealing with and tolerating religious minorities.
I recall reading that the motivation for people such as Friedman is the idea that Israel's establishment should only happen when the Messiah came, not through political maneuvering or the UN. So they regarded Israel as illegitimate from the very first.
And here's a letter explaining this group, and likening them to the Judenrat in the Nazi era:
...the Muslims who thirst for Jewish blood are using the Neturei Karta [the orthodox anti-Zionist group] as the Nazis once used the Judenrat (a Nazi-organized system of "Jew Councils" staffed by local Jews and established for the purpose of liaising between the Nazis and the ghettoized Jewish population pending their deportation to the death camps) -- namely, to provide a Jewish veneer for the annihilation of Jews.
A perfect way to put it: a Jewish veneer for the annihilation of Jews.
Here's a discussion of the horrific dilemma that was faced by those tapped to become part of the Judenrat; the situation was not always a simple one of collaboration or self-centeredness. And the ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionists by no means represent an exact parallel.
These modern day ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionists are part of an ancient tradition, however, that of the "useful Jew" (somewhat akin to the "useful idiot"). It's true that, under threat of death (as in the World War II Judenrat), the normal human desire to save one's own skin operates in all groups. But what's Friedman's excuse?
[[NOTE: I was reminded of this phenomenon when I read Siggy's post of the day, in which he likened the so-called "religious progressives" and their complicity with anti-Semitism to the Judenrat of World War II. He also discusses some of the moral complexities of the Judenrats' dilemma.]
I'm speaking of the ultra-orthodox religious Jews who are anti-Zionist. That's their prerogative, of course; eveyone's entitled to his/her opinion, yada yada yada.
But some of them go further then that; in fact, it turns out that six of the delegates to the mid-December 2006 Iranian Holocaust denial conference were such Jews. Collaborating with an Iran bent on the destruction of Israel and Jews is quite a stretch.
And, amidst the hatefest that the conference represented, you can be sure that those Jews were not ignored by the press. In fact, they were highlighted in many instances. Granted, it's a sort of "man bites dog" story, inherently both fascinating and shocking--but still.
For example, several British papers had articles on the conference that featured only one photo illustrating the event. What visuals did they see fit to show? You guessed it; only the anti-Zionist Orthodox Jews (see this, for example).
It's hard to know quite what to say about this one. I'll start by simply quoting it:
[Austrian rabbi Moshe Friedman] noted, "We should focus on the reality that the behind-the-curtain individuals and financial providers as well as perpetrators of some of the World War II crimes had been Zionists themselves." Now another Holocaust has taken place, this time involving Palestinians and Arabs -- something unprecedented in history, he added.
The Austrian Rabbi also thanked Iran as the best venue for the conference on the Holocaust because it used to remain neutral during the World War II and was not involved in the event.
Friedman described Iran as a model country in dealing with and tolerating religious minorities.
I recall reading that the motivation for people such as Friedman is the idea that Israel's establishment should only happen when the Messiah came, not through political maneuvering or the UN. So they regarded Israel as illegitimate from the very first.
And here's a letter explaining this group, and likening them to the Judenrat in the Nazi era:
...the Muslims who thirst for Jewish blood are using the Neturei Karta [the orthodox anti-Zionist group] as the Nazis once used the Judenrat (a Nazi-organized system of "Jew Councils" staffed by local Jews and established for the purpose of liaising between the Nazis and the ghettoized Jewish population pending their deportation to the death camps) -- namely, to provide a Jewish veneer for the annihilation of Jews.
A perfect way to put it: a Jewish veneer for the annihilation of Jews.
Here's a discussion of the horrific dilemma that was faced by those tapped to become part of the Judenrat; the situation was not always a simple one of collaboration or self-centeredness. And the ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionists by no means represent an exact parallel.
These modern day ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionists are part of an ancient tradition, however, that of the "useful Jew" (somewhat akin to the "useful idiot"). It's true that, under threat of death (as in the World War II Judenrat), the normal human desire to save one's own skin operates in all groups. But what's Friedman's excuse?
[[NOTE: I was reminded of this phenomenon when I read Siggy's post of the day, in which he likened the so-called "religious progressives" and their complicity with anti-Semitism to the Judenrat of World War II. He also discusses some of the moral complexities of the Judenrats' dilemma.]
Sunday, January 07, 2007
5 things you don't know about me
I've been tagged for one of those meme things by my friend Fausta, "five things you don't know about me."
Ah. what to divulge? I have an unusual breadth of choice, since some of the most basic facts about me are unknown on the blog (real name and specific place of residence, for starters). So I suppose I could take this as an opportunity for a huge unveiling.
I don't think so. But I will reveal the following:
(1) Sometimes I do toy with the idea of "coming out," and divulging my actual name and un-apple-shielded photo. Maybe some day.
(2) I am a fabulous cook, if I do say so myself (and I do say so myself). Maybe my trolls would like it if I put more recipes up here. Nope, suppose not.
(3) Doing the podcast was a big deal for me because I've always been a bit sensitive about my voice. Not my voice in private life--that seems okay--but as a public vehicle for getting points across. I have always been more comfortable writing; I prefer the ability to craft and to contemplate, although on a blog I rarely get the chance or the time to craft things as much as I'd like. Other times, when I've performed, I've been voiceless; a dancer. So the podcast has been a real stretch for me, but I've enjoyed it more than I imagined I would.
(4) I have small feet, hands, and ears. In fact, when I buy gloves, I need to go to the children's section, and this despite the fact that I'm of more or less average height. I mourn the fact that gloves no longer come in sizes other than small, medium, large--the "small" being jumungous, as far as I'm concerned. I think I used to be a size 5, which they actually used to make, and they actually used to fit.
(5) I'm a wonderful friend. Ask any of my friends.
Oh, and here's a sixth: a posed photo from my dancing days, just turned sixteen. I look exactly and precisely the same now, of course.
[ADDENDUM: I forgot to pass the meme baton. Take it or leave it, folks, as you wish: Sisu, Alexandra, Shrinkwrapped, Dr. Sanity, and Varifrank.
Ah. what to divulge? I have an unusual breadth of choice, since some of the most basic facts about me are unknown on the blog (real name and specific place of residence, for starters). So I suppose I could take this as an opportunity for a huge unveiling.
I don't think so. But I will reveal the following:
(1) Sometimes I do toy with the idea of "coming out," and divulging my actual name and un-apple-shielded photo. Maybe some day.
(2) I am a fabulous cook, if I do say so myself (and I do say so myself). Maybe my trolls would like it if I put more recipes up here. Nope, suppose not.
(3) Doing the podcast was a big deal for me because I've always been a bit sensitive about my voice. Not my voice in private life--that seems okay--but as a public vehicle for getting points across. I have always been more comfortable writing; I prefer the ability to craft and to contemplate, although on a blog I rarely get the chance or the time to craft things as much as I'd like. Other times, when I've performed, I've been voiceless; a dancer. So the podcast has been a real stretch for me, but I've enjoyed it more than I imagined I would.
(4) I have small feet, hands, and ears. In fact, when I buy gloves, I need to go to the children's section, and this despite the fact that I'm of more or less average height. I mourn the fact that gloves no longer come in sizes other than small, medium, large--the "small" being jumungous, as far as I'm concerned. I think I used to be a size 5, which they actually used to make, and they actually used to fit.
(5) I'm a wonderful friend. Ask any of my friends.
Oh, and here's a sixth: a posed photo from my dancing days, just turned sixteen. I look exactly and precisely the same now, of course.
[ADDENDUM: I forgot to pass the meme baton. Take it or leave it, folks, as you wish: Sisu, Alexandra, Shrinkwrapped, Dr. Sanity, and Varifrank.
Saturday, January 06, 2007
No surge, Dems urge: beware those helicopters!
You think I sing a repetitious dirge
“Iraq, Vietnam; please let the two diverge!”
But here’s some news: the Democrats they urge,
“Oh Mr. Bush, don’t recommend a surge!”
And why? They say we’re surely on the verge
Of failure. It’s inevitable. A scourge
Successor Pres (a Dem?) will have to purge
As copters on the roof, they re-emerge.
Yes, you might accuse me of becoming a bit obsessed about this Vietnam/Iraq bitter end comparison. But it keeps surfacing in the news, even if I try to avoid it.
For example, in the article in the NY Daily News that inspired my poem, this is the statement by Senator Joseph Biden that I found especially infuriating in light of history:
In an obvious reference to Vietnam, Biden said Bush intended to leave it to the next President to land "helicopters in the Green Zone, taking people off the roof."
Okay, Joe, you brought it up. And, if you want to be partisan about it, Vietnam was a war in which the major escalation and commitment of US combat forces was the decision of two successive Democratic Presidents and solidly Democratic Congresses (controlled by the Democrats with substantial majorities for the entire duration of the war).
The Republican President who succeeded the two Democrats, Nixon, presided over the drawdown of US troops known as Vietnamization. Those helicopters on the roof were the direct result of the abrupt and sharp reduction of funding voted by a Democratic-led Congress, which made the defeat of the South virtually inevitable and rather sudden, as well. A new Republican President, Ford, was left holding that bag—but the bag was filled mostly by Democrats.
President Bush is a stubborn man, it’s true. He has no intention of abandoning Iraq, although if the Democrats (and some Republicans, to be sure) have anything to say about it they will force him to. But to suggest, as Biden has, that President Bush’s motivation for wanting a surge is to delay things in order to screw the new administration (Biden probably hopes and expects it to be a Democratic one) that will succeed Bush is one of the lowest statements I’ve heard in a good long while, even from a Senator.
The article in the Daily News mentions that Harry Reid has said Bush's commanders aren't in favor of a surge, and so he's "shuffling them in and out" till he finds one who agrees with him. This article in the NY Times describes the situation as far more complex (of course) than Reid indicates. The military has long been divided into two disagreeing camps on that score. The new commander, General Petraeus, labeled as "articulate," is one of the strong advocates of the surge approach. He has overseen the drafting of a recent new counterinsurgency manual, an area in which he seems to be expert.
This doesn't mean the new effort will succeed, even if it manages to clear the Congressional hurdles being set up for it. After all, it's a military truism that no battle plan survives contact with the enemy. But it's not surprising that Bush has chosen a general who believes in the same approach that Bush favors, and who represents a different point of view than those who have gone before. And it's no surprise, either, that this point of view is not in line with the defeatist stance of Democrats such as Biden, with visions of helicopters on the roof dancing in his head.
Interestingly enough, it was Saddam Hussein who presciently foresaw this course of events. As I wrote at the time of our November elections:
...no one's ever accused Saddam of being dumb. Here's an interesting tidbit that shows how smart he really was: in the buildup to the Iraqi war in 2003, Saddam was already making the Vietnam analogy:
In the days leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, television stations there showed 1975 footage of U.S. embassy support personnel escaping to helicopters from the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. It was Saddam's message to his people that the United States does not keep its commitments ...
Too bad he isn't around to see it all, isn't it?
“Iraq, Vietnam; please let the two diverge!”
But here’s some news: the Democrats they urge,
“Oh Mr. Bush, don’t recommend a surge!”
And why? They say we’re surely on the verge
Of failure. It’s inevitable. A scourge
Successor Pres (a Dem?) will have to purge
As copters on the roof, they re-emerge.
Yes, you might accuse me of becoming a bit obsessed about this Vietnam/Iraq bitter end comparison. But it keeps surfacing in the news, even if I try to avoid it.
For example, in the article in the NY Daily News that inspired my poem, this is the statement by Senator Joseph Biden that I found especially infuriating in light of history:
In an obvious reference to Vietnam, Biden said Bush intended to leave it to the next President to land "helicopters in the Green Zone, taking people off the roof."
Okay, Joe, you brought it up. And, if you want to be partisan about it, Vietnam was a war in which the major escalation and commitment of US combat forces was the decision of two successive Democratic Presidents and solidly Democratic Congresses (controlled by the Democrats with substantial majorities for the entire duration of the war).
The Republican President who succeeded the two Democrats, Nixon, presided over the drawdown of US troops known as Vietnamization. Those helicopters on the roof were the direct result of the abrupt and sharp reduction of funding voted by a Democratic-led Congress, which made the defeat of the South virtually inevitable and rather sudden, as well. A new Republican President, Ford, was left holding that bag—but the bag was filled mostly by Democrats.
President Bush is a stubborn man, it’s true. He has no intention of abandoning Iraq, although if the Democrats (and some Republicans, to be sure) have anything to say about it they will force him to. But to suggest, as Biden has, that President Bush’s motivation for wanting a surge is to delay things in order to screw the new administration (Biden probably hopes and expects it to be a Democratic one) that will succeed Bush is one of the lowest statements I’ve heard in a good long while, even from a Senator.
The article in the Daily News mentions that Harry Reid has said Bush's commanders aren't in favor of a surge, and so he's "shuffling them in and out" till he finds one who agrees with him. This article in the NY Times describes the situation as far more complex (of course) than Reid indicates. The military has long been divided into two disagreeing camps on that score. The new commander, General Petraeus, labeled as "articulate," is one of the strong advocates of the surge approach. He has overseen the drafting of a recent new counterinsurgency manual, an area in which he seems to be expert.
This doesn't mean the new effort will succeed, even if it manages to clear the Congressional hurdles being set up for it. After all, it's a military truism that no battle plan survives contact with the enemy. But it's not surprising that Bush has chosen a general who believes in the same approach that Bush favors, and who represents a different point of view than those who have gone before. And it's no surprise, either, that this point of view is not in line with the defeatist stance of Democrats such as Biden, with visions of helicopters on the roof dancing in his head.
Interestingly enough, it was Saddam Hussein who presciently foresaw this course of events. As I wrote at the time of our November elections:
...no one's ever accused Saddam of being dumb. Here's an interesting tidbit that shows how smart he really was: in the buildup to the Iraqi war in 2003, Saddam was already making the Vietnam analogy:
In the days leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, television stations there showed 1975 footage of U.S. embassy support personnel escaping to helicopters from the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. It was Saddam's message to his people that the United States does not keep its commitments ...
Too bad he isn't around to see it all, isn't it?
Friday, January 05, 2007
Could Congress pull off a 1974-1975 redux, after all?
Yesterday I wrote about the limitations Congress might face in opposing a "surge" of American troops in Iraq if--as rumor would have it--such a surge is part of Bush's new Iraq policy to be unveiled next week.
Today I read this article by E.J. Dionne, which describes some more creative solutions contemplated by Democratic leaders such as Biden.
As I wrote yesterday, at this point the only direct way to oppose the surge would be some sort of vast reduction in military funding as a whole--as opposed to the mere cutting back of foreign aid to a specific country, as was done to the South Vietnamese at the tail end of 1974, when US combat forces had departed years earlier.
But there are indirect ways, as well--for example, a Congressional resolution which could, according to Biden:
...have a powerful effect if it drew support from the significant number of Republican senators who are increasingly alienated from Bush's policies. An anti-surge resolution might not bind the president, says Biden, but it would exert considerable pressure on him to reconsider his approach.
I'm not sure he doesn't underestimate (or "misunderestimate") Bush's ability to resist such pressure. After all, as I pointed out yesterday, it's not as though Bush is up for re-election. And I'm not sure he cares all that much, either, about the re-election prospects of those Republicans in Congress who might be anti-surge, especially when weighed in the balance against what he sees as the importance of fighting the insurgency and terrorists in Iraq.
But Biden has a few more tricks up his sleeve. And in this, he's also aided by (what else?) the ghost of Vietnam:
Biden is studying whether Congress might reconsider the original Iraq War resolution, which is now as out of date as the news stories of 2002, the year it passed. The resolution includes references to a "significant chemical and biological weapons capability'' that Iraq didn't have and repeated condemnations of "the current Iraqi regime,'' i.e., the Saddam Hussein regime that fell long ago. In effect, the resolution authorizes a war on an enemy who no longer exists and for purposes that are no longer relevant.
Dionne also points out that Senator Carl Levin has high hopes for the passage of a resolution he has crafted with another Democratic Senator, Jack Reed, calling for benchmarks and a withdrawal plan.
It remains to be seen what effect such resolutions might have on this particular President. But the drawback of any such "benchmarks and a withdrawal plan" is that they would make our schedule public and transparent not only to US citizens but also to the enemy, who would be more than willing to lay low during any "surge," wait it out, and take over after we left.
The inherent telegraphing to our enemy of our lack of intent to--in that hackneyed, overused, but still important phrase, "stay the course"--would probably be a fatal blow to any campaign we might mount at this point. To put the kindest face on it, I wonder whether Biden, Levin, and their colleagues realize how important it is to communicate motivation and resolve to any enemy.
The consequences of the pullout in Vietnam were not only huge for those who suffered thereafter in Vietnam and Cambodia, but for the perception of American will and strength in the world. Our words and our promises were considered hollow; we were now a paper tiger. The same would be true--only perhaps more so--for an abandonment of Iraq.
The sharp cutoff in funding to South Vietnam that I mentioned in yesterday's post was only one of several efforts by Congress back then, however, to tie the hands of the US in prosecuting the Vietnam War, even after our combat troops had been withdrawn. Vietnam timelines indicate the following, as well, acts which served to clearly telegraph our lack of intent there:
June 24, 1970 - The U.S. Senate repeals the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. [Perhaps a precedent for Biden's current plans outlined above?]
June 19, 1973 - The U.S. Congress passes the Case-Church Amendment which forbids any further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, effective August 15, 1973. The veto-proof vote is 278-124 in the House and 64-26 in the Senate. The Amendment paves the way for North Vietnam to wage yet another invasion of the South, this time without fear of U.S. bombing.
This amendment was passed after all US combat troops had been withdrawn. It also would have tied Nixon's (or any subsequent President's) hands in any efforts to fulfill Nixon's "secret promise" to South Vietnam at the time of the Peace Accords that the US would come to their aid militarily if the North violated the terms of those Accords in the future. Because of Congress, both the North and the South knew that was not going to happen.
Here's another move by Congress from the timeline:
November 7, 1973 - Congress passes the War Powers Resolution requiring the President to obtain the support of Congress within 90 days of sending American troops abroad.
This somewhat controversial resolution, whose constitutionality has been debated, remains in force today. It's an example of the constant tension between the executive and legislative branches of government on the question of the powers to wage war, especially limited actions that fall short of a full declaration of war.
If you go back to that Vietnam timeline and read about events during the year 1972, you'll get a deeper appreciation of what was happening there as Vietnamization progressed. As US fighting forces withdrew, the South Vietnamese were not doing badly against the North. However, there were heavy Vietnamese casualties on both sides (although not US ones) and the international community was protesting.
Crucial US support at the time consisted not just of military and technical aid, but of bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and mining harbors in the North. Note, especially, that the various Linebacker operations had been fairly successful against the North. The Case-Church amendment, passed not long after as a result of outrage against the casualties involved, made it a certainty that no more such operations could be launched.
Read, also, the years 1973 through 1975. The Peace Accords represented a strange compromise that allowed Northern forces to remain in the South, against the will of the South Vietnamese, who were powerless to object because of their fear that the US would cut assistance (which, of course, ended up happening anyway). The successive acts of Congress mentioned above, even before the final financial blow at the end of 1974 (particularly the Case-Church amendment), effectively curtailed the US ability to respond, and the North and South both knew it.
The history of struggle between Congress and the President for control of war powers reached a head during Vietnam. Iraq and Vietnam are different, but they are linked in certain ways. The next few months will see a repeat, not of the specific details, but of the general principles of the jockeying for power between the two branches.
The consequences were huge back in the 70s. This time they will be even larger, no matter which way it goes.
Today I read this article by E.J. Dionne, which describes some more creative solutions contemplated by Democratic leaders such as Biden.
As I wrote yesterday, at this point the only direct way to oppose the surge would be some sort of vast reduction in military funding as a whole--as opposed to the mere cutting back of foreign aid to a specific country, as was done to the South Vietnamese at the tail end of 1974, when US combat forces had departed years earlier.
But there are indirect ways, as well--for example, a Congressional resolution which could, according to Biden:
...have a powerful effect if it drew support from the significant number of Republican senators who are increasingly alienated from Bush's policies. An anti-surge resolution might not bind the president, says Biden, but it would exert considerable pressure on him to reconsider his approach.
I'm not sure he doesn't underestimate (or "misunderestimate") Bush's ability to resist such pressure. After all, as I pointed out yesterday, it's not as though Bush is up for re-election. And I'm not sure he cares all that much, either, about the re-election prospects of those Republicans in Congress who might be anti-surge, especially when weighed in the balance against what he sees as the importance of fighting the insurgency and terrorists in Iraq.
But Biden has a few more tricks up his sleeve. And in this, he's also aided by (what else?) the ghost of Vietnam:
Biden is studying whether Congress might reconsider the original Iraq War resolution, which is now as out of date as the news stories of 2002, the year it passed. The resolution includes references to a "significant chemical and biological weapons capability'' that Iraq didn't have and repeated condemnations of "the current Iraqi regime,'' i.e., the Saddam Hussein regime that fell long ago. In effect, the resolution authorizes a war on an enemy who no longer exists and for purposes that are no longer relevant.
Dionne also points out that Senator Carl Levin has high hopes for the passage of a resolution he has crafted with another Democratic Senator, Jack Reed, calling for benchmarks and a withdrawal plan.
It remains to be seen what effect such resolutions might have on this particular President. But the drawback of any such "benchmarks and a withdrawal plan" is that they would make our schedule public and transparent not only to US citizens but also to the enemy, who would be more than willing to lay low during any "surge," wait it out, and take over after we left.
The inherent telegraphing to our enemy of our lack of intent to--in that hackneyed, overused, but still important phrase, "stay the course"--would probably be a fatal blow to any campaign we might mount at this point. To put the kindest face on it, I wonder whether Biden, Levin, and their colleagues realize how important it is to communicate motivation and resolve to any enemy.
The consequences of the pullout in Vietnam were not only huge for those who suffered thereafter in Vietnam and Cambodia, but for the perception of American will and strength in the world. Our words and our promises were considered hollow; we were now a paper tiger. The same would be true--only perhaps more so--for an abandonment of Iraq.
The sharp cutoff in funding to South Vietnam that I mentioned in yesterday's post was only one of several efforts by Congress back then, however, to tie the hands of the US in prosecuting the Vietnam War, even after our combat troops had been withdrawn. Vietnam timelines indicate the following, as well, acts which served to clearly telegraph our lack of intent there:
June 24, 1970 - The U.S. Senate repeals the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. [Perhaps a precedent for Biden's current plans outlined above?]
June 19, 1973 - The U.S. Congress passes the Case-Church Amendment which forbids any further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, effective August 15, 1973. The veto-proof vote is 278-124 in the House and 64-26 in the Senate. The Amendment paves the way for North Vietnam to wage yet another invasion of the South, this time without fear of U.S. bombing.
This amendment was passed after all US combat troops had been withdrawn. It also would have tied Nixon's (or any subsequent President's) hands in any efforts to fulfill Nixon's "secret promise" to South Vietnam at the time of the Peace Accords that the US would come to their aid militarily if the North violated the terms of those Accords in the future. Because of Congress, both the North and the South knew that was not going to happen.
Here's another move by Congress from the timeline:
November 7, 1973 - Congress passes the War Powers Resolution requiring the President to obtain the support of Congress within 90 days of sending American troops abroad.
This somewhat controversial resolution, whose constitutionality has been debated, remains in force today. It's an example of the constant tension between the executive and legislative branches of government on the question of the powers to wage war, especially limited actions that fall short of a full declaration of war.
If you go back to that Vietnam timeline and read about events during the year 1972, you'll get a deeper appreciation of what was happening there as Vietnamization progressed. As US fighting forces withdrew, the South Vietnamese were not doing badly against the North. However, there were heavy Vietnamese casualties on both sides (although not US ones) and the international community was protesting.
Crucial US support at the time consisted not just of military and technical aid, but of bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and mining harbors in the North. Note, especially, that the various Linebacker operations had been fairly successful against the North. The Case-Church amendment, passed not long after as a result of outrage against the casualties involved, made it a certainty that no more such operations could be launched.
Read, also, the years 1973 through 1975. The Peace Accords represented a strange compromise that allowed Northern forces to remain in the South, against the will of the South Vietnamese, who were powerless to object because of their fear that the US would cut assistance (which, of course, ended up happening anyway). The successive acts of Congress mentioned above, even before the final financial blow at the end of 1974 (particularly the Case-Church amendment), effectively curtailed the US ability to respond, and the North and South both knew it.
The history of struggle between Congress and the President for control of war powers reached a head during Vietnam. Iraq and Vietnam are different, but they are linked in certain ways. The next few months will see a repeat, not of the specific details, but of the general principles of the jockeying for power between the two branches.
The consequences were huge back in the 70s. This time they will be even larger, no matter which way it goes.
Ford's veto?
Yesterday's post of mine was linked at Dean Esmay, and my old friend mikeca wrote a critique in the comments section there.
I've already debated mikeca's viewpoint about whether or not the South Vietnamese ARVN might have held off against the North if our support had continued, here, so there's no need to take that question up again. But I was intrigued by his assertion that Ford did not veto the late-1974 bill that pulled the financial plug on the ARVN.
It's an interesting question, although not an especially important one, because I'm actually in agreement with mikeca's contention that it was not only the Democrats who were for abandoning Vietnam; some Republican members of Congress were in favor of it, as well. Ford, only a few months into his unelected Presidency, most definitely didn't have the stomach necessary for the fight, either. He saw his mission as a healing, uniting one, although he himself would have preferred the funding continue.
I went to the links mikeca gives on the subject, as well as doing a number of new searches of my own, and it's still not clear what actually happened. There's no question the funding was cut substantially, and that what was appropriated was woefully inadequate, and that this led to the unraveling of the morale and the fighting ability of the ARVN, as well as the opposite for the North--a conviction, quite correct, that they would now be able to achieve their goal of conquering the South, which occurred in short order.
But the rest of the details are murky. I got my original information that Ford had vetoed the bill from Wikipedia (see under the heading "South Vietnam Stand Alone, 1974-1975"), but no source was given there, nor could I find one.
Vietnam timelines state that the fund cuttoff occurred in Congress in September of 1974, which would have been a month after Nixon's Watergate-inspired resignation. And yet Ford's signing statement for the bill, which mikeca links to, occurred on December 30, 1974.
If I were more familiar with how long it ordinarily takes bills to go from passage to signing, I'd be more able to analyze what the four-month delay might have meant. One possibility, however, is that the bill was indeed initially vetoed by Ford and then overridden, and that he signed it after the override. That's mere speculation, however; I could find nothing else on the subject other than assertions such as that in Wikipedia that there had been a veto, without citations or sources.
We do have the evidence of what Ford thought about the cutoff, however, in his words in the signing statement:
In South Vietnam, we have consistently sought to assure the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own futures free from enemy interference. It would be tragic indeed if we endangered, or even lost, the progress we have achieved by failing to provide the relatively modest but crucial aid which is so badly needed there. Our objective is to help South Vietnam to develop a viable, self-sufficient economy and the climate of security which will make that development possible. To this end, the economic aid requested represented the amount needed to support crucial capital development and agricultural productivity efforts. The lower amount finally approved makes less likely the achievement of our objectives and will significantly prolong the period needed for essential development.
The understatement of the century.
I've already debated mikeca's viewpoint about whether or not the South Vietnamese ARVN might have held off against the North if our support had continued, here, so there's no need to take that question up again. But I was intrigued by his assertion that Ford did not veto the late-1974 bill that pulled the financial plug on the ARVN.
It's an interesting question, although not an especially important one, because I'm actually in agreement with mikeca's contention that it was not only the Democrats who were for abandoning Vietnam; some Republican members of Congress were in favor of it, as well. Ford, only a few months into his unelected Presidency, most definitely didn't have the stomach necessary for the fight, either. He saw his mission as a healing, uniting one, although he himself would have preferred the funding continue.
I went to the links mikeca gives on the subject, as well as doing a number of new searches of my own, and it's still not clear what actually happened. There's no question the funding was cut substantially, and that what was appropriated was woefully inadequate, and that this led to the unraveling of the morale and the fighting ability of the ARVN, as well as the opposite for the North--a conviction, quite correct, that they would now be able to achieve their goal of conquering the South, which occurred in short order.
But the rest of the details are murky. I got my original information that Ford had vetoed the bill from Wikipedia (see under the heading "South Vietnam Stand Alone, 1974-1975"), but no source was given there, nor could I find one.
Vietnam timelines state that the fund cuttoff occurred in Congress in September of 1974, which would have been a month after Nixon's Watergate-inspired resignation. And yet Ford's signing statement for the bill, which mikeca links to, occurred on December 30, 1974.
If I were more familiar with how long it ordinarily takes bills to go from passage to signing, I'd be more able to analyze what the four-month delay might have meant. One possibility, however, is that the bill was indeed initially vetoed by Ford and then overridden, and that he signed it after the override. That's mere speculation, however; I could find nothing else on the subject other than assertions such as that in Wikipedia that there had been a veto, without citations or sources.
We do have the evidence of what Ford thought about the cutoff, however, in his words in the signing statement:
In South Vietnam, we have consistently sought to assure the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own futures free from enemy interference. It would be tragic indeed if we endangered, or even lost, the progress we have achieved by failing to provide the relatively modest but crucial aid which is so badly needed there. Our objective is to help South Vietnam to develop a viable, self-sufficient economy and the climate of security which will make that development possible. To this end, the economic aid requested represented the amount needed to support crucial capital development and agricultural productivity efforts. The lower amount finally approved makes less likely the achievement of our objectives and will significantly prolong the period needed for essential development.
The understatement of the century.
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